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1 Introduction
Whilst negotiations continue on the reform of the
global financial architecture, there has been very
little discussion of the need to redesign the loosely-
knit international framework that is currently in
place for addressing environmental problems,
despite an increasing acknowledgement of its
shortcomings. One institutional alternative that has
been suggested is the creation of a World
Environment Organisation (WEO) to accelerate the
responsiveness of the international system to envi-
ronmental challenges. This body would have a
wider mandate than the WEO advocated by the
director-general of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), Renato Ruggerio. His suggestion is for a
WEO to act merely as a legal and institutional
counterpart to the WTO.'Here we discuss some of
the possibilities for an alternative World
Environment Organisation (WEO), being dis-
cussed in a research project supported by the
MacArthur Foundation and involving research
institutions in both the developed and the devel-
oping world.2
The project recognises that global institutional
design is, at present, a topic that is very much out
of vogue; and this seem to be true both of environ-
mental and other policy areas. Global organisa-
tions, such as the UN, the World Bank, IMF and
WTO, are seen as too numerous; potentially cap-
tured by their own corporatist self-promotion; and,
in the eyes of some, inessential, since whatever
cooperative behaviour they induce could probably
be generated by the parties to the cooperation
without the presence of an institution. To generate
interest in and support for an institutional innova-
tion such as a World Environment Organisation
therefore, one has to argue convincingly that there
See Ruggerio's speech at the High Symposium on Trade
and Environment, 15th March 1999, available at the
WTO web site.
The project evaluates the rationale, possible
organisational form and implications for developing
countries of a WEG. The project is being coordinated by
Professor John Whalley (Warwick) and Dr Peter Newell
(IDS) with developing country partners in India (the
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Economics
Research) and Argentina (Facultad Latinoamericana de
Ciencias Sociales) in the first instance. A summary version
of the article is also to appear in the United Nations
Development Programme Human Development Repon.
is an unambiguous and major problem, whose res-
olution is best achieved by the institution creation.
The rationale for a new institution is as follows:
Despite the proliferation in international agree-
ments on the environment since the 1970s, the
rate of ecological devastation in many areas pro-
ceeds faster than ever before.
The current way in which environmental
accords are reached is excessively slow, rule- or
principle-driven, often reliant upon science for
progress and subject to the veto power of small
numbers of states.
The current international environmental agenda
is perceived by southern countries as a northern
dominated agenda which fails to address their
concerns. Moreover, existing mechanisms for
reconciling environment and development
objectives (such as the Global Environment
Facility) have made a minimal overall impact.
There is an increasing awareness of the limits of
using traditional aid and technology transfer
packages to facilitate NorthSouth cooperation.
Such transfers are viewed suspiciously as a sub-
sidy to Northern businesses seeking to offload
redundant technologies that tend to entrench
dependencies rather than enhance the develop-
ment prospects of poorer countries.
Many environmental agreements to date suffer
from a failure of implementation. Commitments
have not been met, and there has been a lack of
effort to address the causes of non-compliance
rooted in institutional incapacity and poor
incentive structures.
2 Developing Countries and the
WEO
Critical to the success of a WEO will be its ability to
navigate the (largely) NorthSouth conflicts that
previously have been a factor in stalling interna-
tional negotiations on the environment. The negoti-
ating histories of the ozone and climate issues, as
well as Antarctica, biodiversity and forests, all sug-
gest the ongoing importance of the contest over the
apportionment of blame for environmental prob-
lems and the appropriateness of various mecha-
nisms to 'induce' the cooperation of the South (for
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example, commitment time-lags and a fund in the
case of ozone; commitments conditional upon tech-
nology transfer in the case of climate change).
There is a perception among some in the North that
developing countries have sought to use the concern
about environmental issues as a bargaining chip for
reasserting a global agenda reminiscent of the New
International Economic Order of the 1970s, includ-
ing demands for the regulation of transnational cor-
porations (TNCs) and greater provision of aid.
Opponents of environmental measures in the OECD
have used sensitivities over these concerns as a basis
for arguing against deeper involvement in interna-
tional regimes to protect the environment, on the
basis that Northern countries are being 'blackmailed'
into making concessions to what they regard as
unreasonable demands. At the same time, many
developing countries view environmental issues as
the latest attempt by the North to control their
development. Charges of 'eco-colonialism' abound
amid debates over who is entitled to lay claim to nat-
ural assets such as rainforests, which belong to one
country, but whose use and exploitation have global
repercussions (McCleary 1991).
Past experience suggests that institutions set up to
address these problems have been disabled by
accusations of bias towards a Northern agenda on
environmental issues. The GEF, for example, seeks
to implement conventions which Southern coun-
tries often cannot or do not want to fund (Young
and Boehmer-Christiansen 1998). There was also
little consultation in the creation of the GEF, par-
ticularly with the parties that were to receive its
funds, and so the perception that the GEF was
imposed persists. The provision of aid and tech-
nology transfer has been the principal mechanism
used in the past to encourage the cooperation of
less develOped member states in international envi-
ronmental negotiations, as side payments (com-
pensation) to break down their resistance to
undertakïng commitments. A range of concerns
has arisen with respect to these instruments on the
part of LDCs (and others). The use of aid as a 'car-
rot' for participation in international environmental
arrangements has been criticised on the grounds
that it acts more to support Northern consultancies
and southern élites, than as a solid basis for
advancing sustainable development (Keohane and
Levy 1997). In addition, environmental technology
is often privately owned and it is difficult for states
to force companies to share their property (Forsyth
1998). More generally, with vertical 'point-to-
point' transfers, there is concern that the technol-
ogy is outdated and ineffective. LDCs provide
useful outlet markets for the redundant technolo-
gies of the North and often help to keep Northern
manufacturers of these technologies afloat. The
technologies are also often not adapted to local
needs and priorities, and, to be successful, skills as
well as technology, have to be transferred, which
rarely happens (Forsyth 1998). Hence rather than
enabling 'leap-frogging', such transfers can further
entrench existing inequalities and dependencies.
Given these experiences, it is easy to see why
many LDCs are wary of the existing incentives
offered to induce their cooperation on environ-
mental matters. However, there has been a shift in
some parts of the developing world towards an
acceptance of the role that private investment can
play in financing projects, manifested, for exam-
ple, by acceptance of the role of joint implemen-
tation and NorthSouth projects overseen by the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This may
suggest a window of opportunity to contemplate
a new mechanism for brokering NorthSouth
deals. Building on the lessons learned in debt-for-
nature swaps' and the practices that will evolve
within the Kyoto Protocol's CDM, there may be a
case for an institution which seeks to broker deals
in a more open but flexible fashion, Hence where
short-term economic benefits are clear to recipi-
ents, where they are targeted at projects and the
protection of resources that are of benefit and
concern to recipient countries, and where such
countries are involved in activating the deals
themselves, opportunities that are not served by
traditional aid and technology transfer become
available. The challenge for a WEO is to pursue
such opportunities in a way which is not regarded
as a breach of sovereignty, and which allows for
genuine interaction from all sides about the direc-
tion of funding commitments.
21 Objectives of a WEO
lt is difficult to envisage a single institution that
could simultaneously address all of these problems
associated with international environmental coop-
eration. A WEO could nevertheless perform a num-
ber of functions that would strengthen responses to
environmental degradation.
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lt would aim to:
(i) Actos an intermediary and initiator of cross-country
internalisation deals
The functions of and objectives for a WEO all build
on the theme that an internalisation failure exists in
the global environmental area and that this can best
be remedied by providing a new global institutional
arrangement. The centrai objective for such an
organisation is to facilitate cross-country deals on
environmental issues which have the effect of rais-
ing environmental quality. This is a wholly different
approach from that set out in Agenda 21, where a
series of principles are seen as the way to build the
global environmental regime. This project stresses
the design of mechanisms which facilitate higher
environmental quality over adherence to principles.
The deals that a WEO would propose are seen as
unachievable with present institutions and policy
initiatives, including market-guided arrangements.
A series of spin-off benefits from meeting the cen-
tral objective of internalisation, such as underpin-
ning domestic environmental policies, particularly
in developing countries, can also be realised (see
below).
A WEO would act as an intermediary generating
internalisation arrangements between countries
which are currently not taking place on global and
local environmental issues. Thus, it is commonly
pointed out both that side payments do not occur
to any significant degree in existing inter-country
environmental arrangements, and that financial
resource transfers from OECD countries (where
demand for global environmental quality is high) to
lower income countries with significant endow-
ments of environmental assets do not take place on
a regular basis. If they occur, it is as a requirement
of being a signatory to one of the global treaties
such as the Framework Convention on Climate
Change. Beyond this narrow category, such trans-
fers have effectively not taken place.
This absence of financial arrangements to cement
and underpin environmental arrangements occurs
for good reasons. First, there are problems of time
consistency If, for example, Brazil were to promise
to contain deforestation over, say 40 years, in return
for financial inflows, then if the flows were paid
immediately Brazil would request more funds after
the initial receipt; but if funds were paid at the end
of the period, Brazil would have no assurance that
payment would be forthcoming. Added to this is
the problem that an arrangement entered into by
one government may not be honoured by a follow-
ing government which is either unwilling or unable
to fulfil the terms of the agreement made to another
state. Some form of intermediary guarantee for both
sides is needed to reduce the element of risk
involved in these transactions. Next, come prob-
lems of verification and compliance: who ensures
that the pledged environmental target has been met,
and what the remedies are if this is not the case?
Then follow problems of free-riding: if many coun-
tries have existence value over Brazilian forests and
deals are bilateral, countries free-ride on each
others deals. Lastly come problems of representing
preferences for deals: who assesses and acts on
behalf of the collective willingness of OECD coun-
tries to pay for slowed deforestation? This is pre-
sumably national governments, but how they are to
do this and with what effect is unclear.
These and many more reasons explain why cross-
country deals on environmental issues have been
lowest common denominator in outcome,3 They
are also impediments to environmental improve-
ment that a deal-making WEO can help to address.
This is not to suggest that a WEO could resolve all
of these deeply rooted problems, but that it may
contribute to the alleviation of some of them. A
WEG could act as an intermediary, receiving and
holding funds until determinations are made as to
compliance (with either transfer to the recipient
country, or return to the sponsoring country). A
WEO could also provide verification as to whether
the terms of deals have been met, and act as a dis-
pute settlement and arbitration vehicle. This would
go much further even than the CDM which will
initiate and oversee NorthSouth transactions on
climate change with oversight by the Conference of
the Parties. A WEG could be proactive in identify-
ing areas and countries between whom deals
would make sense, and initiate proposals on that
basis. lt could coordinate single country offers and
explicitly seek to internalise free riding in the deals
it brokered. It could also propose mechanisms to
be used in countries to assess and reflect collective
willingness to pay.
See also Heal (1993) discussion of the formation of
coalitions supporting international environmental
agreements.
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In short, it could undertake any activity that filled
in the gaps of Coasian deal-making (see below) on
a global scale. It would obviously have no power to
conclude deals - these would be for national gov-
ernments to decide on; but proposals for deals,
mechanisms to support deals, and arrangements to
enforce deals would all be the bailiwick of the
WEG. The main rationale, therefore, for a WEG is
to redress failures of international negotiation in
international environmental policymaking that
move the global economy closer to achieving a
fuller internalisation of global environmental exter-
nalities.
It is the economic theory of externalities that is ger-
mane to debate on whether or not the world needs
a new World Environment Organisation, and which
underpins the line of argument in this piece. This
theory rests on two central contributions. Pigou
(1920) was the first economist to clearly identify
that where there are external effects in either pro-
duction or consumption which do not appear in
private agents' calculations, a tax which equates
marginal private and marginal social cost will inter-
nalise the externality; this is because private deci-
sions become coincident with appropriate social
decision-making. Thus, with, say, cross-border
externalities such as acid rain, the emitting country
(or more precisely, producers in the emitting coun-
try) needs to bear not only their own production
costs of the energy they produce, but also the costs
they inflict on users of lakes outside the country If
these added costs are part of their production deci-
sions, the externality is internalised.
Coase (1960) went beyond Pigou in two crïtical and
key elaborations. First, Coase argued that the issue
of who should pay these additional costs (or pay the
internahsation tax) was a matter of property rights:
who has rights to do what. Coase pointed out that
economic analysis is silent on the issue of who
should have these rights. Thus, in the acid rain
example, do emitters have rights to produce energy,
in which case lake users must bribe emitters to
reduce their emissions; or do lake users have rights
to uncontaminated lakes, so that emitters must
bribe lake owners for permission to emit at various
levels? The lake example may seem clear, but Coase
argued that for many externalities most would agree
there is ambiguity as to who has property rights.4
The issue of the basis upon which property rights
can or should be allocated and exercised in the
international environmental area has been con-
tentious, as the debate on allocations of permits to
emit carbon clearly shows. The ongoing dispute
over who 'owns' the rainforests has also been the
crux of the breakdown in global cooperation on this
issue (Hurnphreys 1996; McCleary 1991). The idea
of a common heritage of mankind has been one
rhetorical device for depoliticising the issue of own-
ership, hut again the cases of Antarctica and the
deep-sea bed illustrate the limits of this approach
where there are clear economic interests at stake
(Vogler 1995).
Second, Coase argued that in the presence of an
externality, bargaining (or Coasian deals) may well
have already taken place, which either wholly, or
partially, internalises the externality Use of an inter-
nalisation tax where Coasian deals have already
been entered into can be counter-productive and
even worsen resource allocation. Subsequent litera-
ture has focused on identifying cases where such
deals are likely to occur and where they are not, and
how far they may have gone towards internalising
externalities.
The relevance of these contributions for a World
Environmental Organisation is that the present day
global environmental policy regime, such as it is,
has evolved in seeming ignorance of these two fun-
damental contributions to debate on environmental
problems. We have no global environmental entity
reflecting a vision and purpose comparable in
design to the WTO or the IM such as achieving
the internalisation of trans-border and global exter-
nalities. What we have instead are environmental
treaties which have spawned in an ad hoc manner.
Most are global, some are regional. Most have a
evolved from a scientific process: identifying harm-
ful substances, setting levels for emissions, and
attempting to achieve international acceptance
through treaty ratification. Because many of the key
global environmental issues are unidirectional
Coase also argued that the assignment of property
rights would only he a matter of income distribution; it
would not affect the outcome under internalisation.
See the further discussions in Carraro and Siniscalco
(1993), and Hod and Schneider (1997).
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between one group of countries and other coun-
tries, the outcome of such narrowly focused treaties
has often been based on minimal lowest common
denominator formulae. There are effectively no side
payments in such treaties; and so Coasian deals
have not been facilitated by such treaties.'
Extend and deepen treaty commitments
A further set of activities for a \VEO would be to
bring existing cross-country environmental treaties
under a single umbrella, with the aim of broadening
and deepening existing commitments. New
exchanges of concessions across areas might also be
possible as a result of this. Commitments in the
form of binding standards, for instance, would
allow for exchanges of concessions, much as in the
WTO. More innovative treaty arrangements might
also allow for more progress to be made on the issue
of side-payments.° By creating multiple systems of
obligations and cross-referencing commitments,
cooperation between more parties might also be
achieved and incentives to free-ride would be
reduced by a growth in zones of agreement.
Facilitate environmental and non-environmental
policy linkages
By bringing global environmental arrangements
under a single umbrella, a WEO would also make it
easier for cross-country concessions to be
exchanged between environmental and non-envi-
ronmental areas, potentially leading to both a
stronger environmental regime and gains elsewhere.
Thus, developing countries might make conces-
sions on their environmental policies in return for
improved trade access (say, in textiles and apparel).
A central problem in making such concessions is
the existing patchwork quilt of global environmen-
tal arrangements, and by systemising these a WEO
would greatly facilitate bargaining of this kind.
Developing countries have, of course, been cautious
over such bargaining, arguing that they should be
compensated for undertaking environmental
restraint of the form sought by OECD countries and
fearful that a willingness to bargain indicates both a
relaxation of this position and, implicitly, a conces-
sion on property rights. By providing institutional
See also Barrett's (1994) discussion of self enforcing
international environmental agreements.
support for connections across issue-areas in this
way, however, incentives to cooperate are multi-
plied and the basis for cooperation is significantly
broadened. Permit trading (where there have been
attempts to develop credit systems for rewarding
sacrifices and encouraging compliance) and debt-
for-nature swaps both aim to facilitate NorthSouth
transfers, which explicitly link environmental com-
mitments to economic gain, and demonstrate
precedents for cross-issue linkages which can deal
simultaneously with the concerns of both devel-
oped and developing countries,
(iv) Use an international structure to underpin domes-
tic environmental policy
A central issue with environmental policy especially
in developing countries, is enforcement and com-
pliance. An international entity in the environmen-
tal area, such as the WEO, might also lend support
to those domestic groups (including N GOs) trying
to raise levels of compliance within domestic policy
regimes. Beyond performing the information clear-
ing-house functions of the Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD), which collects
and reviews information about parties' fulfilment of
their UNCED obligations, a WEO could have at its
disposal a wider range of surveillance mechanisms.
lt could build institutional capacity in less devel-
oped states based on a recognition that in the past
compliance has been hampered by administrative
weakness and poor institutional infrastructure. This
is different from the current implementation of
environmental agreements, where a more laissez-
faire approach is adopted as to how countries
choose to enforce their commitments.
2.2 Organisational forms
Towards these goals a WEO could take the follow-
ing forms:
In its earliest stages, the organisation would start
life as a deal-brohering intermediary body. lt
would act as a unit to initiate and oversee the
implementation of financial transactions, where
developed countries put up a sum of money for
the protection of a natural resource in the South,
which the WEO administers and guarantees. lt
would provide verification as to whether the
terms of the deals have been met as well as act
as a dispute settlement and arbitration vehicle.
This would go further than the proposals for an
21
international Bank for Environmental
Settlements which would limit itself to the bor-
rowing and lending of emissions rights.
There would he no set format for these transac-
tions, no overarching principles or general rules
to which arrangements would have to conform.
Although deals would be concluded largely at a
country-to-country level, countries would also
represent agents within countries (consumers,
companies). All countries who are members of
the World Environment Organisation would
have a seat on its governing council and would
sign a protocol of accession committing them to
engage in the creative pursuit of erivironmen-
tally improving arrangements. The Council
would then give an indication to member coun-
tries of the provisions a WEO offers to facilitate
environmental deals. These would include veri-
fication and intermediation of financial arrange-
ments necessary for such deals. The Council
would provide examples of implementable
deals, with full information as to how they
might operate and be applied in various cir-
cumstances. The Council could also instruct
staff to seek out possible deals and propose var-
ious cross-country arrangements.
Added to this, the WEO could also act as a
clearing house bank which issues credits to coun-
tries for sacrifices (measured in GNP) made in
not exploiting a particular resource valued by
the international community These credits can
then be offset against obligations in another
issue area, so there is overall equity in the sacri-
fices countries make. For example, countries
with significant rainforest cover would have an
incentive to reduce deforestation because they
could then avoid having to accept cuts in their
greenhouse gas emissions (up to the value of
their credit).
The Council could also initiate negotiating
rounds across environmental issues. Because of
the 'free-rider' problems associated with bilat-
eral deals, a negotiating round with a series of
deals discussed simultaneously would likely
make more progress than stand-alone arrange-
ments. The WhO Council could initiate negoti-
ations aimed at streamlining and codifying the
separate environmental treaties that now exist.
Going further, the WEG could act as a mecha-
nism by which environmental commitments
from LDCs are rewarded (for example) with
trade concessions from the North as a way of
simultaneously addressing the concerns of
both. The Council of the WEO could suggest
possible cross-linkage negotiations with countries
testing out what non-environment concessions
may be attainable for what degree of environ-
mental commitment. Brazil for example would
be offered a degree of market access that would
compensate for loss of growth incurred by
reducing the rate of deforestation. The danger
with proposals which seek to connect trade and
environment however, is that the North may be
able to exercise its trade leverage to get the
South to relinquish one of the few bargaining
chips it does have: control over natural
resources which matter to the North.
Nevertheless, with a WEO acting as an interme-
diary, the likelihood of this may be reduced.
Depending on the success of the WEO as a deal-
brokering body it would go on to acquire greater
powers and responsibilities over time, taking on
some of the functions described above. Such an
entity, where it combines all of these functions, is
unlikely to be implemented in the near term. There
may only be sufficient political demand at this stage
for the minimal deal-brokering organisation. The
extent to which the international community is
willing to move towards stronger institutional trans-
formations will be a function of the perceived suc-
cess of early initiatives, as well as changes in
scientific understanding and levels of public con-
cern about the environment and the global costs of
a lack of internalisation.
The advantages of such an organisation are as follows:
Cooperative agreements can be struck immediately.
Deal-brokering is not tied to the normal con-
ventions of environmental diplomacy Whilst
there would have to be some agreement on pro-
cedures, the WEG would not be constrained by
the need for standard setting, or agreement on
general principles. Only those parties that are
interested in participating in these exchanges
would have to sign up. Agreements are not dri-
ven, therefore, by the need to find a lowest
common denominator formula acceptable to
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all. Once a critical mass is on board, a snowball'
effect may develop whereby other countries are
attracted to and drawn into the deal-making.
Where payment is made for the preservation of
a specific set of resources, gains accrue directly to
the party that makes the sacrifice in terms of
financial reward, and countries that are con-
cerned about an issue/area/species can act
immediately towards its protection.
The NorthSouth deals initiated by the WEG
help to get round the perception that environ-
mental concern is a guise for the West to con-
trol the development path of the South.
Southern partners would be able to approach
the WEG with ideas for projects to be funded
and bid for money to be invested in particular
environmental programmes or projects. By tak-
ing the lead in suggesting projects, LDCs are in
a better position to set the agenda. In a 'display-
by-pay' system such as this, the North would be
in a position to demonstrate to Southern coun-
tries the extent of its concern about environ-
mental problems. At the same time the gains
from short-term sacrifice are made visible and
therefore more acceptable to Southern parties.
By forging links among environmental issue
areas as well as between environment and non-
environment issues, the zone of potential agree-
ment is significantly widened and opportunities
for cooperation increase. This may particularly
be the case where trade issues are added and
LDCs can gain an economic advantage from
environmental concessions. Even in deals
restricted to environmental issues, LDCs would
receive direct financial 'compensation' for
undertaking commitments for the benefit of the
international community. This is likely to be
more persuasive than asserting the stewardship
responsibilities of countries that are host to
globally significant ecological resources.
By creating an immediate financial incentive
towards the implementation of agreements a
WEG would improve compliance. In broader
terms, by using it's status, legitimacy and
resources the WEG would be in a position to
support domestic environmental reform in
countries where projects are being funded, by
supplying information and suggesting institu-
tional innovation based on best practice models
imported from elsewhere. As a guarantor of
financial deposits from industrialised countries,
the WEG would help to ensure that longer-term
commitments are kept and that financial com-
mitments are honoured.
It is less bureaucratic. A minimalist 'display-by-
pay' system would be less expensive to sustain
than the creation of a vast new institutional
superstructure. This is important in terms of the
speed with which the WEG could oversee
deals, but also in terms of its political accept-
ability in the current political climate of scepti-
cism about excessive international bureaucracy
It is realistic. The reduced scepticism among
some LDCs towards the role of private invest-
ment in meeting environmental goals, reflected
in attitudes towards the use of the CDM and
Joint Implementation in the Kyoto Protocol for
example, suggests there is a window of oppor-
tunity to think afresh about new ways of bridg-
ing NorthSouth conflicts in environmental
debates. The fact that the private sector would
assist in implementing some of these deals
again helps to get around the laborious process
of inter-state accord.
There is scope for such an institution. The con-
ception of a WEG as a deal-brokering entity, is
unlikely to conflict with the mandate of exist-
ing institutions such as the CSD, UNEP, or GEE
However, if the WEG were to take on ail the
functions described above, particularly with
respect to streamlining existing environmental
agreements, it would undoubtedly overlap
with the mandate of the CSD for example. But
whilst there would clearly be a period of
accommodation while these institutions estab-
lish a division of competence amongst them-
selves, the initial version of a WEG, as it is
envisaged here, is unique and should compli-
ment rather than repeat on the work of other
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